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States of the World and the 
State of Decision Theory
Mark J. Machina
University of California, San Diego
TWO EXTRAORDINARY NONSCIENTISTS
Almost 20 years ago, I briefly knew a man by the name of Craig.
Although he died about a year after I met him, I’ve thought about him
ever since. Craig had this uncanny ability to converse with a person for
a few minutes, and then announce what make and model of car they
drove. Neither I, nor anyone I ever spoke to, had ever seen him get it
wrong. Craig was never able to explain how he did it, and his unique
ability followed him to the grave. 
What Craig had perfected was an impressive skill—perhaps even
an art—but it was not science. It was not science because it was not a
procedure that he could verbally communicate or write down, so that
other people in other places or other times could do it also. One of the
defining features of scientific activity is that it generates a body of
knowledge and techniques that can be communicated and utilized by
others in this way.
I also knew a woman named Tula with an equally impressive abil-
ity. Tula was able to predict how well a person’s day would go, based
on the shape, size, and color of the aura they emitted in the morning.
And in contrast to Craig, she could even explain the specifics of her
method. For example, if your aura was round and blue, you would have
good luck all day. But if it was square and yellow, then you’d best go
back home and stay in bed. Tula had prepared a chart with the com-
plete relationship between properties of your aura and the upcoming
features of your day, so if you had a copy of the chart, you just needed
a daily reading of your aura. Although Tula’s success rate wasn’t per-
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fect (like Craig’s was), it still compared favorably with standard medi-
cal, meteorological, and macroeconomic predictions, and most of her
friends would stop by each morning for a quick reading of their aura,
and then go away to consult their chart.
By constructing and distributing her chart, Tula had codified and
communicated features of her technique in a way that Craig never
could. But since Tula was the only one who could see these auras, what
she was doing still was not science. An activity is not science unless it
involves techniques that others can also apply as well as variables that
others can observe.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine one of the most impor-
tant theoretical constructs of modern decision theory—namely, the
concept of states of the world or states of nature—from the point of
view of these and similar scientific considerations. Are states of nature
inherently descriptive or prescriptive objects? Do individuals making
choices under uncertainty face these states of nature, or do they create
them? Are states external and independently observable, like an indi-
vidual’s commodity demand levels, or are they internal and not directly
observable, like utility or marginal utility levels? In addressing these
questions, I will offer an overview of how researchers have sought to
represent the concept of uncertainty, from the original formulation of
probabilities and “objective uncertainty” in the seventeenth century,
through Leonard Savage’s twentieth century formulation of states of
nature and “subjective uncertainty,” to current work which seeks to
eliminate—or at least redefine—the distinction between objective and
subjective uncertainty. The following section presents some scientific
issues common to all theories of choice, whether under certainty or
uncertainty. The next two sections sketch out the current theories of
choice under objective and subjective uncertainty. After that, I address
the question of whether states of nature should be considered descrip-
tive or prescriptive constructs, and then I consider scientific issues
related to the observability and measurement of states of nature. The
final section concludes with current work on the relationship between
subjective and objective uncertainty.
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SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE THEORY 
OF CHOICE
Scientific Modeling “From the Outside In”
The human decision-making process may well be one of the most
complicated systematic phenomena in the universe. In terms of the
point of view of the scientific observer, it is certainly unique. On the
one hand, a scientist trying to model this process is like an anatomist in
the days before anesthesia and vivisection—scientists can observe and
to some extent even control external influences on a system, and can
observe the resulting behavior of the system as a whole, but they can-
not “get inside” to observe its constituent parts at work. On the other
hand, every scientist is a human decision maker with powers of self-
consciousness and self-reflection. However, self-reflection of our deci-
sion-making processes has not produced that much more “hard sci-
ence” than has, say, self-reflection of our breathing or digestive
processes.
While advances in neuroscience may ultimately do for decision
theory what vivisection did for anatomy, decision theory currently
remains very much a “black box” science. Although decision theorists
can (and do) use introspection to suggest theories and hypotheses, the
rigorous science consists of specifying mutually observable indepen-
dent variables (in particular, the objects of choice available for selec-
tion), mutually observable dependent variables (the selected
alternative), and refutable hypotheses linking the two. In other words,
choice theory attempts to explain why particular alternatives are
selected from a set of available choices.
Issues of Observability
Because decision scientists cannot perform dissection, they are
subject to a greater scientific discipline than that required of anato-
mists. If a decision scientist tried to account for an individual’s pur-
chases of bananas as the direct result of something like an “appetite for
fruit,” we would not know how to test this hypothesis—that is, we
would not know how to independently “look for” such an appetite,
even if we had a scalpel and an open, anesthetized brain. Such unob-
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servable constructs like appetites, utility, and preferences can—and
do—play a role in scientific decision theory, but only as inside links in
a causal chain that ultimately starts with fully observable independent
variables and ultimately ends with fully observable dependent vari-
ables. For example, given the joint hypothesis that well-defined com-
modity preferences exist and are also stable from day to day, standard
consumer theory allows us to infer enough information about these
preferences from an individual’s past demand behavior to be able to
make refutable predictions about their future demand behavior, even
for some combinations of prices and income never before observed.
In the following sections, we shall see that in passing from choice
over certain commodity bundles to choice over uncertain prospects
(either “objective lotteries” or “subjective acts”), hypotheses involving
the unobservable constructs of commodity preferences and utility func-
tions can be replaced by hypotheses involving the unobservable con-
structs of risk preferences and beliefs, which also link observable
independent to observable dependent variables. Whether the notion of
“states of nature” can similarly serve remains to be discussed. 
Issues of Classification
In order for a variable or phenomenon to satisfy the criterion of
“scientific observability,” it is not enough that more than one scientist
be able to see it—it is not even enough that a camera be able to record
it. Rather, a variable is only scientifically observable if independent
observers can agree on their description of what they have just
observed. Thus, while a scientist can photograph facial expressions,
they cannot be said to have photographed expressions of emotion
unless there is a well-defined specification of which expressions corre-
spond to each emotion, and independent observers predominantly
agree in their assignment of emotions to each photograph. In other
words, scientific observability requires well-defined and commonly
accepted classification schemes for the observations, sufficient for
grouping and comparing such observations, and relating them to gen-
eral hypotheses and theories. 
Just as different types of variables can have different degrees of
observability, different classification schemes will have different
degrees of common agreement. Thus, in regular consumer theory, we
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are much more prone to classify commodities and define preferences in
terms of category schemes like {“fruits,” “vegetables,” “grains”} com-
pared to schemes like {“delicious foods,” “filling foods,” “unpleasant
foods”}. Although the latter scheme is in some sense much more
directly connected to any given individual’s preferences than the
former scheme, the latter scheme cannot be defined independently of
the particular consumer being studied. Since foods cannot be classified
according to this latter scheme prior to observation of the consumer’s
(verbal or choice) behavior, it cannot be used as a classification scheme
for independent variables. Categories like “delicious foods,” “unpleas-
ant foods,” etc. can be defined for dependent variables, however, either
on the basis of the consumer’s verbal expressions, or on the basis of
their past purchases or consumption behavior. Thus, whether a given
classification scheme does or does not satisfy the criterion of scientific
observability may well depend upon whether the scheme is intended to
be applied to the independent variables or to the dependent variables of
a theory. 
Issues of Measurability
The above example of classifying facial photographs into different
categories of emotions is an example of a qualitative classification of
the basic observations. Although qualitative categories and qualitative
variables are perfectly valid in the physical, biological, and social sci-
ences, theories and hypotheses are most powerful when they involve
quantitative independent and dependent variables. Many economists
are of the opinion that economics has a more impressive scientific
track record than anthropology because economists work with numeri-
cal variables such as prices, quantities, and income, rather than with
qualitative variables like trust, group identification, or loyalty. Most
theories and hypotheses involving quantitative independent and depen-
dent variables are easier to test, to fine tune, and if necessary, to revise,
than most theories and hypotheses involving qualitative variables.
Is uncertainty an inherently qualitative or quantitative construct? In
the following sections we shall see that one of the two primary meth-
ods of representing uncertainty—the so-called “objective approach”—
represents uncertainty quantitatively, via numerical probabilities. On
the other hand, the other primary method—the so-called “subjective
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approach”—has traditionally represented uncertainty in a qualitative
manner, via an unstructured set of states of nature. However, in the
final section of this paper, we see that taking a measurable, quantitative
approach to subjective uncertainty can enhance its power, and in many
senses can serve as an almost complete substitute for what may be con-
sidered the more ad hoc assumptions made about the world in the
objective approach.
CHOICE UNDER OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY
Outcomes, Probabilities, and Objective Lotteries
The earliest formal representation of uncertainty came from
founders of modern probability theory such as Pascal and Fermat. In
this approach, the uncertainty attached to any event is represented by a
numerical probability p between 0 and 1. Because probability theory
derived from the study of games of chance that involved virtually iden-
tical repeated events, such probabilities were held to be intrinsic prop-
erties of the events in the sense that an object’s mass is an intrinsic
property of the object. These probabilities could either be calculated
from the principles of combinatorics, for an event such as being dealt a
royal flush, or measured by repeated observation, for an event like a
bent coin landing heads up.
For an individual making a decision under objective uncertainty,
the objects of choice are objective lotteries of the form P =
(x1,p1;...;xm,pm), which yield outcome xi with objective probability pi,
where p1 + … + pm = 1. The theory of choice under uncertainty treats
lotteries in a manner almost identical to the way it treats commodity
bundles under certainty. That is, each individual’s preferences over
such lotteries can be represented by a real-valued preference function
V(⋅), in the sense that for any pair of lotteries P* =
and P = (x1,p1;...;xm,pm), the individual prefers P* over P if and only if
V(P*) =  exceeds V(P) = V(x1,p1;...;  xm,pm), and is
indifferent between the two lotteries if and only if V(P*) =
exactly equals V(P) = V(x1,p1;...;xm,pm).1
1 1( , ;...; , )m mp px x∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗
1 1( , ;...; , )m mV p px x∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗
1 1( , ;...; , )m mp px x∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗
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The Expected Utility Hypothesis
In standard consumer theory, the preference function over com-
modity bundles is typically assumed to have certain mathematical
properties but is typically not hypothesized to take any specific func-
tional form, such as the Cobb-Douglas or Constant Elasticity of Substi-
tution form. Specific functional forms are typically only used when
absolutely necessary, such as in empirical estimation, calibration, or
testing.
In contrast, the standard theory of choice under objective uncer-
tainty typically does assume (or does assume axioms sufficient to
imply) a specific functional form for the individual’s preference func-
tion over lotteries, namely the objective expected utility form
VEU(x1,p1;...;xm,pm) = U(x1) ⋅p1 + … + U(xm) ⋅pm for some von Neu-
mann-Morgenstern utility function U(⋅). Mathematically, the character-
istic features of this functional form are that it is additively separable in
the distinct (xi,pi) pairs, and also that it is linear in the probabilities.
The term “expected utility” arises since it can be thought of as the
mathematical expectation of the variable U(x) (the individual’s “utility
of wealth”) if wealth x has distribution P = (x1,p1;...;xm,pm). The litera-
ture on choice under uncertainty has generated a number of theoretical
results linking the shape of the utility function to aspects of the individ-
ual’s attitudes toward risk, such as risk aversion or comparative risk
aversion for a pair of individuals. Excellent discussions of the founda-
tions and applications of expected utility theory can be found in stan-
dard graduate level microeconomic texts such as Kreps (1990, Chapter
3), Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, Chapter 6), and Varian
(1992, Chapter 11).
Violations of the Expected Utility Hypothesis
Although the expected utility model is sometimes viewed as being
quite flexible (since the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
could have any shape), it does generate refutable predictions. Unfortu-
nately, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that individuals’
preferences over lotteries tend to systematically violate some of these
predictions. Risk preferences tend to systematically depart from the
expected utility property of linearity in the probabilities. The most
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notable example of this is the well-known Allais Paradox (Allais
1953), which asks individuals to rank each of the following pairs of lot-
teries (where $1M denotes $1,000,000):
Experiments by Allais and others have found that the modal (and in
some studies, the majority) choices are for a1 over a2 in the first pair,
and a3 over a4 in the second pair. However, a preference for a1 in the
first pair implies that the utility function satisfies the inequality
0.11⋅U($1M) > 0.10⋅U($5M) + 0.01⋅U($0), whereas a preference for a3
in the second pair implies 0.11⋅U($1M) < 0.10⋅U($5M) + 0.01⋅U($0),
which is a contradiction. 
Although the Allais Paradox was originally dismissed as an iso-
lated example, subsequent work by MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979),
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and others have uncovered a qualita-
tively similar pattern of departure from the expected utility hypothesis
of linearity in the probabilities, over a large range of probability and
payoff values (see Machina 1983, 1987 for surveys of this evidence).
NON-EXPECTED UTILITY MODELS OF RISK 
PREFERENCES
Responses to the above-mentioned violations of the expected util-
ity hypothesis have taken two forms. One branch of the literature has
proceeded by positing more general functional forms for the preference
function (Edwards 1955, 1962; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Chew
1983; Fishburn 1983; Quiggin 1982; and Yaari 1987). Such forms
accommodate most of the observed departures from linearity in the
probabilities, and, given the appropriate curvature assumptions, can
{1 2
3 4
0.10 chance of $5M
: 1.00 chance of $1M versus : 0.89 chance of $1M
0.01 chance of $0
0.10 chance of $5M 0.11 chance of $1M:  versus :
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also exhibit standard features like risk aversion, comparative risk aver-
sion, etc.
A second line of work in non-expected utility theory proceeds in a
manner closer to that of standard consumer theory—rather than adopt-
ing some new functional form, it generalizes the expected utility prop-
erty of linearity in the probabilities to its natural extension of
smoothness in the probabilities (e.g., Machina 1982). That is, it treats
the preference function V(x1,p1;...;xm,pm) as a general smooth function,
and studies how properties of its probability derivatives relate to atti-
tudes toward risk. This approach finds that much of expected utility the-
ory is analytically robust to departures from linearity in the
probabilities.2
CHOICE UNDER SUBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY
States, Events, Outcomes, and Acts
From a mathematical perspective, the representation of uncertainty
by means of additive, numerical probabilities allows us to apply the
tremendous body of analytical results of modern probability theory
(e.g., Feller 1968, 1971; Billingsley 1986). But from a modeling per-
spective, the assumption that uncertainty comes prepackaged with
well-defined, measurable “objective” probabilities is unrealistic. Out-
side of the gambling hall, most economic decisions and transactions
involving uncertainty—investment decisions, search decisions, insur-
ance contracts, financial instruments—are defined in terms of uncer-
tain events rather than numerical probabilities.
This approach to representing uncertainty and uncertain pros-
pects—formalized by Savage (1954) and now known as the subjective
approach—involves the following basic constructs:




A wonderful example of the use of this framework to represent an
uncertain decision was provided by Savage (1954, pp. 13–15): Say you
are making omelets and have already broken five of your six eggs into
a mixing bowl. The decision you must make is: Do you break the sixth
egg? The uncertainty arises from the fact that this sixth egg has been
around for some time and might be rotten. You can either break this
egg into the bowl with the other eggs, break it into a separate saucer to
inspect it, or throw it away unbroken. Savage represents this problem
in terms of states, acts, and outcomes by means of the following table:
The Hypothesis of Probabilistic Sophistication
Although the subjective approach drops the assumption that uncer-
tainty is defined in terms of numerical probabilities, it still allows for
S= {...,  s ,  ...} a space of mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive states of nature, representing 
all possible alternative unfoldings of the 
world.
E= {...,  E ,  ...} an algebra of events, each a subset of S.
ƒ(⋅) = [x1 on E1;...; xm on Em] subjective act yielding outcome xi in 
event Ei, for some partition {E1,...,Em} of 
S (or equivalently, yielding outcome ƒ(s)
in state s).
A = {...,ƒ(⋅),...} the set of all such subjective acts.
W(⋅) and the individual’s preference function and 
corresponding preference 
relation over A. 
State
Act Egg is good Egg is rotten
Break into bowl Six-egg omelet No omelet, and five good 
eggs destroyed
Break into saucer Six-egg omelet, and
a saucer to wash
Five-egg omelet, and
a saucer to wash
Throw away Five-egg omelet, and
one good egg destroyed
Five-egg omelet

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individuals to possess probabilistic beliefs, with the feature that such
beliefs may now differ across individuals. Formally, an individual is
said to be probabilistically sophisticated, with a subjective (or per-
sonal) probability measure μ(⋅) over the events E, if their preference
function W(⋅) over subjective acts takes the form 
WPS(ƒ(⋅)) = WPS(x1 on E1; ...; xm on Em) = V(x1, μ(E1); ...;  xm,μ(Em))
for some (not necessarily expected utility) preference function V(P) =
V(x1,p1;...;xm,pm) over lotteries. That is to say, an individual is proba-
bilistically sophisticated if their uncertain beliefs can be completely
summarized by a subjective probability μ(E) attached to each event E,
and the individual evaluates each subjective act ƒ(⋅) = [x1 on E1;...;xm
on Em] solely on the basis of its implied probability distribution
(x1,μ(E1);...;xm,μ(Em)) over outcomes. This representation of WPS(⋅) as
the composition of a preference function V(⋅) over lotteries and a sub-
jective probability measure μ(⋅) over events is now referred to as the
classical separation of risk preferences from beliefs.
Violations of the Hypothesis of Probabilistic Sophistication
Savage’s (1954) joint axiomatization of expected utility risk pref-
erences and probabilistic beliefs, employing an expected utility func-
tion for the risk preference function, has been justly termed “the
crowning glory of choice theory” (Kreps 1988, p.120). However, the
violations of expected utility first observed by Allais were soon
matched by violations of probabilistic sophistication, even in situations
involving the simplest forms of subjective uncertainty. The most
famous of these examples, known as the Ellsberg Paradox (Ellsberg
1961, 2001), involves drawing a ball from an urn containing 30 red
balls and 60 black or yellow balls in an unknown proportion. The fol-
lowing table illustrates four subjective acts defined over the color of
the drawn ball, when the entries in the table are payoffs or outcomes:
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When faced with these choices, most subjects prefer act ƒ1(⋅) over ƒ2(⋅),
on the grounds that the probability of winning $100 in ƒ1(⋅) is guaran-
teed to be 1/3, whereas in ƒ2(⋅) it could range anywhere from 0 to 2/3.
Similarly, most subjects prefer ƒ4(⋅) over ƒ3(⋅), on the grounds that the
probability of winning $100 in ƒ4(⋅) is guaranteed to be 2/3, whereas in
ƒ3(⋅) it could range anywhere from 1/3 to 1. Although this reasoning
may well be sound, it is inconsistent with the hypothesis of probabilis-
tic beliefs. That is, there is no triple of subjective probabilities {μ(red),
μ(black), μ(yellow)} that can simultaneously generate a preference for
ƒ1(⋅) over ƒ2(⋅) and for ƒ4(⋅) over ƒ3(⋅), since a probabilistically sophisti-
cated individual would only exhibit the former ranking when μ(red) >
μ(black), and only exhibit the latter ranking when μ(red) < μ(black).
Ellsberg also presented what many feel to be an even more fatal
example, involving two urns:
In this example, most subjects are indifferent between g1(⋅) and g2(⋅),
are indifferent between g3(⋅) and g4(⋅), but strictly prefer either of g1(⋅)
or g2(⋅) to either of g3(⋅) or g4(⋅). It is straightforward to verify that there
exist no pair of subjective probabilities {μ(red), μ(black)} for the right-
hand urn—50:50 or otherwise—that can generate this set of preference
rankings. Such examples illustrate the fact that in situations (even sim-
ple situations) where some events come with probabilistic information
30 balls 60 balls
 
red black yellow
ƒ1(⋅) $100 $0 $0
ƒ2(⋅) $0 $100 $0
ƒ3(⋅) $100 $0 $100
ƒ4(⋅) $0 $100 $100
50 balls 50 balls 100 balls
 
red black red black
g1(⋅) $100 $0 g3(⋅) $100 $0
g2(⋅) $0 $100 g4(⋅) $0 $100
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and some events (termed ambiguous events) do not, subjective proba-
bilities do not always suffice to fully encode all aspects of an individ-
ual’s uncertain beliefs. Since most real-world events do not come with
such probabilistic information, Ellsberg’s Paradoxes and related phe-
nomenon deal a serious blow to the hypothesis of probabilistic sophis-
tication.
Non-probabilistically Sophisticated Models of Risk 
Preferences and Beliefs
Just as the Allais Paradox and similar evidence led to the develop-
ment of non-expected utility models of risk preferences, Ellsberg’s
Paradoxes and similar phenomena have inspired the development of
non-probabilistic models of preferences over subjectively uncertain
acts. Such work has also progressed along two lines. One line replaces
the subjective expected utility function with more general functional
forms.3
The second line of research on non-probabilistic models treats
W(x1 on E1; ...; xm on Em) as a general smooth function of the events E1,
..., Em, and show how properties of W(⋅)’s event-derivatives relate to
features of both beliefs and attitudes toward risk, again taking expected
utility as its base case. Appendix 2A presents mathematical features of
this line of research.
ARE STATES OF NATURE PRESCRIPTIVE OR 
DESCRIPTIVE?
The second section in this chapter argued that the scientific suit-
ability of a particular theoretical construct—in that case it was a partic-
ular classification scheme for food—could depend on whether the
construct was meant to be applied to the independent variables of a the-
ory or its dependent variables. This section addresses a similar issue,
namely that certain criteria for suitable specification of the states of
nature can depend upon whether the states are to be used for positive
(that is, descriptive) versus normative (that is, prescriptive) purposes.
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Since its inception, expected utility theory has always straddled the
boundary between being a descriptive and a prescriptive model of deci-
sion making under uncertainty. Even its original presentation by Ber-
noulli (1738) as a “solution” to the St. Petersburg Paradox can be
alternatively interpreted as either a description of why people don’t
assign an infinite certainty equivalent to the Petersburg Game, or a pre-
scription for why an individual shouldn’t assign an infinite certainty
equivalent to the game. Two centuries later, proponents of objective
expected utility theory defended it against the Allais Paradox by shift-
ing their emphasis from the alleged descriptive power of the theory to
its alleged normative power. 
The same points can be made about the particular component of
subjective expected utility theory that forms the central topic of this
chapter—namely the notion of states of nature. It is one thing to assert
that the states of nature approach offers a useful normative framework
for decision making. It is quite a different thing to assert that, for the
most part, this is how individuals actually do go about making deci-
sions in the absence of probabilistic information. We shall consider
each of these two domains in turn—in each case, with the goal of iden-
tifying the proper scientific criteria for states. 
Criteria for Normative Applications
Savage’s omelet example effectively shows how representing
nature’s underlying uncertainty by a set of “states,” then representing
one’s alterative courses of action as “acts” that map these states into
their respective consequences, can serve to organize a decision prob-
lem and make it easier to see exactly how one’s beliefs (the state likeli-
hoods) and risk preferences should enter into the problem. For proper
normative application, this first step—namely, the specification of the
states—must satisfy three properties:
1) The alternative states must be mutually exclusive—that is, no two
distinct states can simultaneously occur. Thus, it would not have
been correct to list “egg is rotten” and “five-egg omelet” as two
distinct states, since is it possible that these could simultaneously
occur.
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2) The family of states must be exhaustive—that is, whatever hap-
pens, at least one of the states can be said to have occurred.
Although it is at the same logical level as the previous criterion
(mutual exclusivity), the exhaustiveness criterion is much more
difficult—and some would argue, actually impossible—to guar-
antee in practice. For example, if you cracked the sixth egg into
the bowl and found that it was actually hollow, then neither of the
two states in the Savage table could be said to have occurred,
since neither of the first-row consequences would be realized
(you would not have a six-egg omelet, nor would you have
destroyed the other five eggs). When the decision maker has rea-
son to “expect the unexpected,” the exhaustivity requirement
cannot necessarily be achieved, and the best one can do is spec-
ify a final, catch-all state, with a label like “none of the above,”
and a very ill-defined consequence.
3) The states must represent nature’s exogenous uncertainty, so their
likelihoods cannot be affected by the individual’s choice of act.
This issue can be illustrated by a simple example involving the
decision whether or not to install a lightning rod on one’s house.
Naturally, the relevant occurrences are the two mutually exclu-
sive results {“house burns down,” “house doesn’t burn down”}.
But since installing a lightning rod will clearly alter the respec-
tive likelihoods of these occurrences, can we really specify states
of nature that are independent of the decision maker’s action?
The answer is illustrated in the following table, which makes it
clear that “house burns down” and “house doesn’t burn down”
are not the states at all, but rather, part of the consequences, and
clarifies that the effect of installing a lightning rod—as with any
subjective act—is the outcome of an interaction between the act











House burns down, 
paid for rod
House doesn’t 
burn, paid for rod




House burns down, 
didn’t pay for rod
House burns down, 
didn’t pay for rod
House doesn’t burn, 
didn’t pay for rod
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Do Decision Makers See the State Space or Do They Construct 
the State Space?
Is an individual who uses states of nature in normative decision
making working with exogenous objects that they observe, or with
endogenous objects that they construct? In one sense, this question is
either subsidiary to, or equivalent to, the question of whether they are
selecting from a menu of alternatives (subjective acts) that they
observe as being available to them, or from a menu of alternatives that
they have thought up or devised. Viewed in this larger sense, the ques-
tion of whether the alternatives are observed or constructed is seen to
have nothing to do with whether the choice happens to involve uncer-
tainty at all, and indeed, the question may be equivalent to the classic
question of whether Alexander Graham Bell discovered the idea for a
telephone or invented this idea. In any case, I cannot derive any impli-
cations of this issue that pertain to the use of states of nature for norma-
tive purposes.
ISSUES OF OBSERVABILITY, CLASSIFICATION, AND 
MEASUREMENT
Independent Observability and the Exogeneity of States
Although the question of whether states are “exogenous and
observed” versus “endogenous and constructed” does not seem to mat-
ter in a context of normative decision making, it matters a great deal for
their relevance in descriptive science, for the types of reasons dis-
cussed in the “Scientific Considerations in the Theory of Choice” sec-
tion. There we argued that economics had made greater scientific
achievements than, say, anthropology because variables like prices and
income were easier to measure than variables like trust or group identi-
fication. But if for some reason it should turn out that the full price of
apples only exists in the eye the consumer and is not independently
observable, then this advantage is lost. This might be the case if the
acquisition of a commodity involves a time cost, set-up cost, or trans-
action cost that is observable to the consumer, but not to the outside
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observer. Note that an inability to observe the true price—an indepen-
dent variable—poses scientific problems even if we can still observe
the exact amount purchased—the dependent variable—since it
impedes our ability to observe the relationship between the two (the
true demand function).
In the context of choice under uncertainty, such a problem would
arise whenever the state space used by the decision maker did not cor-
respond to the state space hypothesized by the scientific observer. In
some sense, this is less likely to happen if the states are exogenous
objects that are observed than if they are endogenous objects that must
be constructed. But even in the former case, there is the possibility that
the decision maker observes either a finer or a coarser set of states than
does the scientist. Ultimately, the question reduces the scientist’s abil-
ity to view the set of actions available to the decision maker—the left-
hand columns in the above decision tables—and correctly predict the
decision maker’s specification (be it an observation or construction) of
both the upper row and cell entries. Where this can and cannot be done
is an empirical question.
Ex Ante Observability versus Ex Post Observability of States
Distinct from the question of whether the scientist can observe the
set of states used by the decision maker is the question of whether the
scientist can observe the realized state, or exactly when the scientist
can observe the realized state. For example, in the case of choice under
certainty—say, the demand for apples—it is clearly more important to
be able to observe the price of apples that the consumer actually faces
upon arriving at the supermarket, than to know the consumer’s prior
expectations of what this price might to be. But interestingly enough,
for choice under uncertainty, the ability to observe the state space
before the fact is of much greater importance than the ability to observe
the realized state. The reason is that choice under uncertainty is by def-
inition ex ante, and only depends upon ex ante features of the decision
problem, namely the state space and the set of available subjective acts
over this space. A scientist who correctly gleans the decision maker’s
formulation of these concepts, who knows his beliefs over the likeli-
hoods of the states, and who knows his attitudes toward risk, will be
able to correctly predict his decision—a decision that by definition
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must be made before, and hence cannot be influenced by, the actual
realization of the state. In both the omelet and the lightning rod exam-
ples, ex post knowledge of the realized state is of no further predictive
use for the scientist, except for possible future decisions, via its effect
on the specification of a state space for some subsequent decision, and/
or likelihood beliefs over this space.
Issues of Classification and Measurement
Are qualitative state spaces likely to be more or less subject to the
above types of observability issues than quantitative state spaces? As
the example of the unobserved apple price illustrates, even real-valued
independent variables—real-valued commodity prices or real-valued
states of nature—are subject to these issues in principle. On the other
hand, decisions where the state space is more naturally quantitative are
probably less subject to these specification difficulties than decisions
where the state space is more naturally qualitative. For example, com-
pare the uncertainty related to investing in a domestic farming com-
pany compared to the uncertainty related to investing in a similar
company located in a politically unstable foreign country. In the former
case, the state space probably only has few dimensions, all of which
are quantitative: the average temperature over the growing season, the
average rainfall over the season, and average output prices at harvest.
In the latter case, the most significant sources of uncertainty may be
subjective—the particular political party that comes to power and its
subsequent choice of expropriation policy. There is every reason to
think that the scientist will do a much better job of modeling the deci-
sion maker’s problem formulation in the first case than in the second
case. Indeed, in the following section we shall see that measurable, as
opposed to qualitative, state spaces can actually serve to bring some
mathematical structure of objective uncertainty into a purely subjective
setting.
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ISSUES OF STRUCTURE: ALMOST-OBJECTIVE 
UNCERTAINTY
As noted, an important feature of objective uncertainty is that it
allows us to apply the analytical tools of probability theory, such as
combinatorics, the Central Limit Theorem, the Law of Large Numbers,
and Chebyshev’s Inequality. Furthermore, since objective probabilities
are part of the objects of choice themselves, these types of results can
be invoked independently of, and prior to, any knowledge of the indi-
vidual’s attitude toward risk. Thus, for example, the conditions under
which the sum of two independent objective lotteries will have the
same distribution as (and thus presumably be indifferent to) some third
lottery will be the same for all individuals. Such results have the same
character as arbitrage results in portfolio theory, which hold indepen-
dently of risk preferences and hence yield extremely powerful results. 
But in some sense, this strength of the objective framework is also
its greatest weakness: it imposes too much uniformity of beliefs across
individuals, and in many cases, too much structure on each individual’s
own beliefs. In contrast with preferences over objective lotteries, pref-
erences over real-world subjective prospects are subject to the follow-
ing three phenomena:
1) Individuals may have different subjective likelihoods for the
same event (diverse beliefs).
2) Individuals’ beliefs may not be representable by probabilities at
all, with some (or all) events being considered ambiguous
(absence of probabilistic sophistication).
3) Individuals’ outcome preferences may depend upon the source of
uncertainty itself (outcome preferences may be state-dependent).
Nevertheless, it turns out that if the state space has a Euclidean struc-
ture and preferences are smooth in the events in the sense described in
Appendix 2A, then features of “objective” uncertainty will emerge
even in a purely subjective setting. In Appendix 2B, we sketch out the
intuition of these results—readers wishing a formal development are
referred to Machina (2001).
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We can summarize the scientific implications of almost-objective
uncertainty as follows: In the more traditional approach to uncertainty
(e.g., Anscombe and Aumann 1963), the world presented two qualita-
tively different types of uncertainty: uncertain processes (such as per-
fectly balanced roulette wheels) that only generated idealized, purely
objective events for which all agents held common beliefs and probabi-
listically sophisticated betting preferences; and uncertain processes
(such as tomorrow’s temperature or rainfall level) that only generated
purely subjective events, where individuals typically differed in their
likelihood beliefs, or had no likelihood beliefs, and could be state-
dependent. On the other hand, according to the concepts presented in
Appendix 2B, once a purely subjective state space is given a Euclidean
structure and preferences are assumed to be smooth in the events, there
exist events that arbitrarily closely approximate all the properties of
classical “objective events” for all decision makers, in spite of any
interpersonal differences in beliefs, lack of probabilistic sophistication,
or state-dependence. Furthermore, once standard “objective randomiz-
ing devices” are reexamined, they are seen to depend precisely on these
type of “almost-objective events.” 
Given the traditional (e.g., Savage 1954) approach of positing an
almost completely unrestricted subjective state space and no event-
smoothness, the “Euclidean state space + event-smoothness” approach
advocated in the previous paragraph might seem overly strong. But in
fact, it is well within standard economic practice. Standard consumer
theory under certainty requires no structure at all on a family of objects
of choice in order to axiomatize an ordinal utility function over these
objects. Debreu’s (1954) original topological assumptions were later
shown to be unnecessary by Kreps (1988, pp. 25–26). But the work-
horse concepts of competitive prices, marginal rates of substitution,
demand functions, and the Slutsky equation do not emerge until we
assume a Euclidean structure for these objects (vector “commodity
bundles” and a Euclidean “commodity space”) and/or smooth prefer-
ences over this space. Under uncertainty, restricting ourselves to a
Euclidean state space amounts to nothing more than restricting our-
selves to subjective uncertainty that appears in the form of random
variables (such as temperature or random prices). And for the types of
reasons discussed earlier in this chapter, real- or vector-valued states of
nature are much more likely to be commonly observable and com-
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monly measurable than are states of nature that are elements of some
more abstract space. 
Just as science in general has progressed most rapidly when it has
been able to quantify and measure the natural world, research in uncer-
tain preferences and beliefs will further progress most rapidly to the
extent we are able to quantify and measure the objects we call “states
of nature” or “states of the world.”
Notes
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1. If the outcomes x describe monetary payoffs, then the standard monotonicity
assumptions are that V(x1,p1;...;xm,pm) is increasing in each of the variables
x1,...,xm, and also increasing whenever pi is increased at the expense of pj for some
pair of outcomes xi > xj (that is, whenever probability mass is shifted from a lower
to a higher outcome).
2. For example, an expected utility preference function U(x1) ⋅p1 + … + U(xm) ⋅pm
will be risk averse if and only if its coefficient with respect to prob(x) (that is, the
value U(x)) is a concave function of wealth. Correspondingly, a non-expected
utility preference function V(P) = V(x1,p1;...;xm,pm) will be risk averse if and only
if its partial derivative with respect to prob(x) (that is, the value ∂V(P)/∂prob(x))
is a concave function of wealth.
3. Such as the Choquet expected utility form
for some utility function U(⋅) and capacity (monotonic non-additive measure)
C(⋅), where the outcomes are labeled so that x1 < … < xm (e.g., Gilboa 1987;
Schmeidler 1989; Wakker 1989, 1990; Gilboa and Schmeidler 1994), or the
maxmin expected utility form
for some utility function U(⋅) and family  of probability measures on
S (e.g., Gärdenfors and Sahlin 1982, 1983; Cohen and Jaffray 1985; Gilboa and
Schmeidler 1989).
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Properties of the Smooth Function Approach to 
Non-probabilistically Sophisticated Models
This approach starts by equivalently reexpressing each act ƒ(⋅) = [x1 on E1;
...; xn on En] in the form ƒ(⋅) = […; x on ƒ–1(x); …] = […; x on Ex; …], as x rang-
es over all possible outcomes The preference functions WSEU(⋅) and
WSDEU(⋅) can then be expressed in the event-additive forms
where the event Ex attached to each outcome x is evaluated by an additive eval-
uation measure Φx(⋅), which is the subjective analogue of objective expected
utility’s probability coefficient U(x).
Just as linearity in a set of variables implies linearity in their changes,
event-additive functions like WSEU (…; x on Ex; …) = and WS-
DEU(…; x on Ex; …) = will also be additive in event changes
(“growth and shrinkage sets”). That is, their ranking of two acts ƒ(⋅) = […; x
on Ex; …] versus ƒ*(⋅) = […; x on Ex*; …] is determined by the additive for-
mulas
where for each x, its growth set in going from ƒ(⋅) to ƒ*(⋅), namely the set Ex*
– Ex, is evaluated positively by x’s evaluation measure Φx(⋅), and its shrinkage
set, namely the set Ex – Ex*, is evaluated negatively by Φx(⋅).
Just as differentiability in objective probabilities can be defined as local
linearity in probability changes, smoothness in subjective events can be de-
fined as local additivity in event changes. That is, one can define a general pref-
erence function W(…; x on Ex; …) to be event-differentiable if at each act ƒ(⋅)
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W(⋅) evaluates small event changes from ƒ(⋅) in the following locally additive
manner:
where the distance function δ(ƒ*(⋅), ƒ(⋅)) between acts has the property that it
shrinks to zero as the change sets Ex* – Ex and Ex – Ex* all shrink to zero, and
(as with any definition of differentiability) o(⋅) denotes a function that is of
higher order than its argument. In Machina (2002), I have shown how this cal-
culus of events can be applied to establish the robustness of most of classical
state-independent and state-dependent subjective expected utility theory and
subjective probability theory to general event-smooth (but not necessarily ei-
ther expected utility or probabilistically sophisticated) preference functions
W(⋅) over subjective acts.
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PROPERTIES OF PURELY OBJECTIVE EVENTS
We begin by contrasting the three properties of subjective events—diverse
interpersonal beliefs, possible absence of probabilistic sophistication, and pos-
sible state-dependence—with the following four characteristic properties of
idealized, exogenous “purely objective” events:
• Unanimous, outcome-invariant revealed likelihoods: In contrast with
the above-listed properties of subjective events, all individuals exhibit
identical, outcome-invariant revealed likelihoods over purely objective
events—corresponding to their objective probabilities.
• Independence from subjective realizations: In the presence of joint
objective × subjective uncertainty, purely objective events are indepen-
dent of the realization of subjective events. Thus, the events generated
by an exogenous objective coin, die, or roulette wheel are invariant to
whether any given subjective event E does or does not occur.
• Probabilistic sophistication over objective lotteries: It is almost a truism
that all individuals evaluate objective lotteries P = (x1, p1; ...; xm, pm)
solely according to their outcomes and corresponding objective likeli-
hoods, via some preference function V(x1, p1; ...; xm, pm).
• Reduction of objective × subjective uncertainty: Standard reduction of
compound uncertainty assumptions imply that individuals evaluate any
objective mixture of subjective acts α ⋅ƒ(⋅) + (1–α)⋅ƒ*(⋅) = α ⋅ [x1 on E1;
...; xm on Em] + (1–α) ⋅ [x1* on E1*; ...; xm** on Em**] solely according to
its induced map […; (xi, α; xj*, 1–α) on Ei Ej*; …] from events to lot-
teries.
The above features of objective uncertainty apply to all individuals, whether or
not they are expected utility, state-independent or probabilistically sophisticat-
ed. The following properties additionally hold for probabilistically sophisticat-
ed individuals and expected utility individuals:
∩
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• Under probabilistic sophistication, independence of objective and sub-
jective likelihoods: If the individual is probabilistically sophisticated
with probability measure μ(⋅) over subjective events, these likelihoods
are independent of exogenous objective events, and vice versa.
• Under expected utility, linearity in objective likelihoods: Expected util-
ity is linear in objective probabilities (VEU(x1, p1; ...; xm, pm)
U(xi) ⋅ pi) and in objective mixtures of lotteries (VEU (α ⋅ P + (1–α)
⋅ P*) α ⋅ VEU (P) + (1–α) ⋅ VEU(P*)). Under objective × subjective
uncertainty, expected utility is linear in objective mixtures of subjective
acts: WSEU (α ⋅ ƒ(⋅) + (1–α) ⋅ ƒ*(⋅)) α ⋅ WSEU (ƒ(⋅)) + (1–α) ⋅ WSEU
(ƒ*(⋅))), and similarly for WSDEU (⋅).
ALMOST-EQUALLY-LIKELY EVENTS AND ALMOST-FAIR BETS
As the above bullet lists indicate, the properties of purely subjective and
purely objective events lie in stark contrast. Nevertheless, in a Euclidean state
space S =   R1, some subjective events are closer to being objective than
others. We illustrate this by an example which approximates what is surely the
“canonical” objective event: namely, the flip of an exogenous, fair coin.
Denoting the events implied by this coin by with standard notation {H,T},
their characteristic property is that, for any pair of prizes x* > x, all individuals
will be indifferent between the bets [x* on H; x on T] and [x on H; x* on T]. In
contrast, for any subjective event E, ranking of the bets [x* on E; x on ~E] ver-
sus [x on E; x* on ~E] can differ across individuals (due to diverse beliefs), or
can reverse if the prizes x* > x are replaced by y* > y (due to state-dependence).
However, consider the event En obtained by dividing the state space S =
into n equal-length intervals, and defining En as the union of the odd-
numbered intervals (the complementary event ~En thus being the union of the
even-numbered intervals). As the following diagram indicates, regardless of
an individual’s particular subjective probability measure μ(⋅) over the state
space S (indicated by its density function m(⋅) in the Figure 2.B1), as n ap-
proaches infinity, the individual will assign equal subjective probabilities of 1/
2 to each of the events En and ~En, and hence be virtually indifferent between
the bets [x* on En; x on ~En] versus [x on En; x* on ~En]. State-dependent indi-
viduals will be similarly indifferent, and as shown in Machina (2001), as n
, all event-smooth individuals—whether or not they are expected utility,
state independent, or even probabilistically sophisticated—will “reveal” En and
~En to be equally likely, via their indifference between any two bets of the form
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the purely subjective events En and ~En—both subsets of the purely subjective
state space S—take on the properties of exogenous objective 50:50 events.
Figure 2B.1  Example of a Subjective Probability Density Function
ALMOST-OBJECTIVE EVENTS, ACTS AND MIXTURES
It is clear that by dividing the state space S =  into a large number of
equal-length intervals and taking the union of every third interval, we could
create an subjective event that approximates the properties of an exogenous
event of probability 1/3, etc. We can extend and formalize this idea as follows:
Given any sufficiently regular (e.g., finite interval union) subset ℘ of the unit
interval [0,1] and any large n, partition S into n equal-length intervals [0, 1/n),
[1/n, 2/n) … [(n–2)/n, (n–1)/n), [(n–1)/n,1], and define the almost-objective
event ℘ S ⊆ S by
that is, as the union of ℘’s linear images into each of S’s n equal-length inter-
vals. Thus, the event En illustrated in the previous figure is simply almost-ob-
jective event [0, 1/2] S.
By taking a partition {℘1, ..., ℘m} of the unit interval we can create al-
most-objective partitions {℘1 S, ..., ℘m S} of the state space S, and in turn
define almost-objective acts [x1 on ℘1 S;... ; xm on ℘m S]. The almost-
fair bets of the previous subsection are seen to be the almost-objective acts [x*
on [0, 1/2] S; x on (1/2, 1] S] and [x on [0, 1/2] S; x* on (1/2, 1] S].
Finally, given two subjective acts ƒ(⋅) = [x1 on E1; ... ; xm on Em] and ƒ*(⋅) =
S
m(⋅)
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[x1* on E1*; ... ; xm** on Em**] and any ℘, ~℘  [0,1], we can define the al-⊆
most-objective mixture [ƒ(⋅) on ℘ S; ƒ*(⋅) on ~℘ S] of ƒ(⋅) and ƒ*(⋅).
BELIEFS AND BETTING PREFERENCES OVER 
ALMOST-OBJECTIVE EVENTS
As with the almost-equally likely events defined above, as n   all
event-smooth individuals will exhibit identical revealed likelihood beliefs over
any almost-objective event  essentially treating it as an exogenous objec-
tive event, with a probability given by the total length λ(℘) of the subset ℘
[0, 1]. That is to say, given any event-smooth preference function W(⋅) over
subjective acts—whether or not it is expected utility/non-expected utility,
state-independent/state-dependent, or probabilistically sophisticated/non-
probabilistically sophisticated—outcomes x* > x, disjoint subsets
with , and subjective act ƒ(⋅), W(⋅) will exhibit
that is, holding the payoffs elsewhere constant, all event-smooth individuals
are unanimous in their preference for staking the greater of two prizes on the
event  and the lesser on , rather than the other way around. Thus,
while we have seen that typical subjective events need not have probabilities at
all, much less unanimously agreed-upon probabilities, as n   there will be
such unanimous agreement on the comparative likelihoods of  ver-
sus . 
The idea that some subjective events come close to exhibiting objective
properties is not new, and precursors of the almost-equal-likelihood example
date back at least to Poincaré (1912). Nor are almost-objective events merely a
technical curiosum—in fact, most real-world “objective randomization devic-
es” are actually examples of the use of almost-objective events to convert non-
probabilistic subjective uncertainty to (almost-) objective uncertainty. To see
this, consider the simple example of a game show spinner divided into a large
number of alternating red and black sectors of equal angular size. Is it correct
to say that the spin of such a wheel is an “objective process”? If so, then it
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defined over this process. But how much agreement will there be on the likeli-
hood of the event that “the wheel spins more than 20 revolutions before finally
stopping”?
Viewed from this perspective, the behavior of the wheel—its exact number
of revolutions and therefore the color of the sector that finishes opposite the
pointer—is a subjective process, where the state of nature is the amount of force
applied to the spin. Individuals will surely disagree on their subjective proba-
bilities of an event like “the force will be enough to generate at least 20 revo-
lutions,” and some may not be able to attach any subjective probably at all to
this event. But if we plot the state (the initial force of the spin) on the horizontal
axis of the previous diagram, then an event such as “the force will lead the
wheel to stop with the pointer opposite a black sector” is seen to be an almost-
objective event of the type illustrated in the figure, which is why even individ-
uals who disagree on the likelihood of “more than 20 spins” will nevertheless
agree on the likelihood of “black.” In other words, it is not the process of spin-
ning the wheel that is either “subjective” or “objective,” but rather the different
events defined on this process that are either subjective or (almost-) objective.
A little thought will reveal that virtually all standard physical randomization de-
vices used to generate “objective” likelihoods share this property of being
based on a subjectively uncertain (and hence non-probabilistic) state variable
(or variables), but working with periodic, “almost-objective” events defined
over the state variable.
The above argument shows that with a structured (essentially Euclidean)
state space and the property of event-smooth preferences, there exists a substra-
tum of events that arbitrarily closely approximate the first of the four above-
listed properties of purely objective events, namely the property of unanimous,
outcome-invariant revealed likelihoods. In Machina (2001) I have shown that
such events, and the acts and mixtures based on them, also arbitrarily closely
approximate the other three listed properties of idealized “purely objective”
events. That is, as n  : 
• Each individual (probabilistically sophisticated or otherwise) will view
all almost-objective events as independent of each purely subjective
event, in the sense that for all disjoint  and each E S,
they will have the same revealed likelihood rankings (i.e., betting pref-
erences) over the joint events (℘ S) E versus  as they
do over the events ℘ S versus S (in each case, corresponding to
the relative values of λ(℘) versus ).
→ ∞
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• Although individuals needn’t be probabilistically sophisticated over
subjective acts in general, they will be probabilistically sophisticated
over almost-objective acts. That is, each W(⋅) will have a corresponding
preference function VW(⋅) over lotteries such that
• Each individual (probabilistically sophisticated or otherwise) satisfies
the reduction of compound uncertainty property for almost-objective
mixtures of acts. Thus if  and
 induce almost-objectively equivalent
subacts over each event in the common refinement of
 then
The following properties of almost-objective uncertainty additionally hold for
probabilistically sophisticated individuals and expected utility individuals:
• Each probabilistically sophisticated individual with subjective probabil-
ity measure μ(⋅) will view all purely subjective events as independent of
each almost-objective event, in the sense that for all  and each
℘ ⊆ [0, 1], they will have the same revealed likelihood rankings (bet-
ting preferences) over the joint events  versus as
they do over the events E versus  (in each case, corresponding to the
relative values of μ(E) versus μ( )).
• Each expected utility maximizer will be linear in almost-objective prob-
abilities and almost-objective mixtures of subjective lotteries, i.e.,
and similarly for WSDEU(⋅).
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